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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Galotti (1989) defines reasoning as “…mental activity that consists of
transforming given information (called the set of premises) in order to reach
conclusions.” Though the focus of the research to be described herein is not to debate
human rationality, that debate (see, e.g., Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Stanovich & West,
2000) has highlighted the difficulty of adequately defining reasoning. In particular,
Stanovich and West's (2000) review of the rationality debate includes commentary from
the standpoint of evolutionary psychology that suggests subjects' systematically poor
performance on logical tasks is often consistent with what would be the most utile
response in the everyday world. The evolutionary suggestion raises a question as to
whether 'reasoning' is best thought of as what logicians do or as what most people do in
their day-to-day lives. Correct responses to reasoning problems, both in this review and
the research to be reported, are the ones expected by normative theorists, i.e., by the
logician, though whether subjects are behaving rationally when they do so (or fail to do
so) is of no concern. For the sake of simplicity then, I will assume human reasoning is as
Galotti (1989) describes it.
Traditionally, logic distinguishes between two types of arguments: inductive and
deductive (Copi & Cohen, 1994). Inductive arguments, generally speaking, involve
making generalizations given a relatively limited set of information. The following is an
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example of a valid categorical induction problem; the solution of this problem requires
the subject to reason probabilistically by combining the information in the premises with
everyday knowledge.
All cows are mammals and have lungs.
All whales are mammals and have lungs.
All humans are mammals and have lungs.
--------------------------------------------------Probably all mammals have lungs. (1)
Deductive arguments are distinguished from inductive ones in that the only
deductively valid conclusions are those that do not invoke information beyond that which
is contained in the premises. Conditional reasoning is an example of deductive logic.
Conditional problems generally state a rule of the form ‘if p then q’, followed by a truth
statement about either p or q. The reasoner must indicate whether a conclusion can be
drawn linking p and q. The important point is that in this case the conclusion is only
valid if it is necessitated by the premises. The following is an example of a valid
conditional reasoning problem.
If Socrates is human then Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is human.
----------------------------------------------------Socrates is mortal. (2)
The distinction between induction and deduction has also been adopted by
psychologists (Evans, 2007; Heit, 2007). A conservative view is that this distinction
applies only to the stimuli themselves, and that the same basic reasoning capacity or
2

mechanism is invoked when a subject attempts to solve inductive and deductive
problems. A more radical view is that induction and deduction also map onto
qualitatively different underlying processes. The view that there are two reasoning
systems has had a considerable impact on the reasoning literature (Evans, 2007; Sloman,
1996; Stanovich & West, 2000).
The focus of this research is to evaluate claims that two reasoning systems
contribute to subjects' responses in reasoning experiments involving syllogisms, which
are a type of deductive argument used widely in research related to this question. It is
also is important to know whether similar conclusions that have been reached in
experiments employing inductive stimuli, such as categorical induction problems,
generalize to experiments that use deductive stimuli such as syllogisms. Inferential and
descriptive techniques developed within the well-established signal detection framework
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) will be applied to data collected
from two syllogistic reasoning experiments, extending previous work by Heit and Rotello
(2005), to be described below.
Syllogistic Reasoning
A great deal of research in the area of deductive reasoning has used syllogisms as
stimuli. Syllogisms are logical arguments consisting of two premises and a conclusion,
which may or may not follow logically from the premises. The task of the subject is to
deduce a conclusion by linking the Z and X terms, referred to as subject and predicate, by
way of their relationships to the middle term. An example of a syllogism is the following
(valid) argument, adapted from Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978):

3

All artists are beekeepers
No beekeepers are chemists
---------------------------------No chemists are artists (3)
Syllogisms may contain concrete or abstract content. An abstract version of (3) might be
the following:
All X are Y
No Y are Z
-------------No Z are X (4)
Three versions of the syllogistic reasoning task are commonly used: conclusion
evaluation, forced-choice, and conclusion production. Subjects in a conclusion
evaluation experiment typically receive examples like (3) and are asked whether the
conclusion they are given follows necessarily from the premises. Subjects in the forcedchoice experiment must choose a conclusion from a set of possibilities that includes ‘no
valid conclusion.’ Subjects in a production task typically receive a set of premises, and
are asked to either respond with a conclusion of their own or to indicate that no valid
conclusion can be drawn.
The building blocks of syllogisms have been shown to affect the number and the
nature of errors subjects commit in attempting to solve them (Dickstein, 1978; JohnsonLaird, 1983). One such factor is quantification. Traditionally, each sentence of the
syllogism can take one of four quantifiers: 'All,' 'No,' 'Some,' and 'Some...are not,' labeled
A, E, I, and O, respectively. An early finding in the literature was that certain
4

combinations of premise quantifiers can bias the subject in favor of particular quantifiers
in the conclusion; this is known as the atmosphere effect (Woodworth & Sells, 1935;
Sells, 1936). Begg and Denny (1969) summed up atmosphere biases with two predictive
heuristics:
1. If there is at least one negative premise ('No' or 'Some...are not'), favor a negative
conclusion; otherwise, favor a positive conclusion ('All' or 'Some').
2. If there is at least one particular premise ('Some' or 'Some...are not'), favor a
particular conclusion; otherwise, favor a universal conclusion ('All' or 'No').
A second effect of quantification is illicit conversion (Dickstein, 1975; 1981; Revlis,
1975). For example, Revlis (1975) pointed out that subjects confronted with relations
such as 'All A are B' may erroneously infer 'All B are A' to be true as well, and that on
some syllogisms in which invalid conclusions are drawn the response may be perfectly
valid if one assumes the converted version of the premise(s) in question. Subsequent
research demonstrated that error rates can be substantially reduced when instruction is
given in logical interpretation of nonconvertible quantifiers (Dickstein, 1975).
Another important factor in the difficulty of syllogisms is figure, which is the
combined ordering of terms in the first and second premises. Since there are two terms
per premise, the arrangement yields four possible syllogistic figures, illustrated in Figure
1.
Holding the order of conclusion terms constant (i.e., X-Z or Z-X), there are 4
possible quantifiers per premise, and 4 possible figures, which yields 4 x 4 x 4 = 64
possible syllogisms. As pointed out by Johnson-Laird (1983), allowing the ordering of
conclusion terms to vary yields a much larger set of 256 possible syllogisms.
5

A landmark experiment by Dickstein (1978), using a five-alternative forcedchoice paradigm and Z-X conclusions, demonstrated that many erroneous responses in
syllogistic reasoning could be accounted for by the relationship between the ordering of
terms in the premises and that of the terms in the conclusion. More specifically, accuracy
for valid syllogisms in figure 1 was higher than for valid syllogisms in figure 4, with 2
and 3 intermediate between the two. Dickstein argued this was because a valid Z-X
conclusion is consistent with the ordering of premise terms in figure 1, while in figure 4 it
is in the opposite direction, which requires 'backward processing' on the part of the
subject and imposes a greater strain on working memory.
When the figure or quantification of a syllogism contributes to the difficulty of its
solution, the effect is referred to as structural. Another source of difficulty is the content
of the problem. Content effects arise when concrete problems are used, and the
quantifiers invoke relations between terms that may or may not arise in the real world.
An example of a pervasive content effect is belief bias (e.g. Cherubini, Garnham, &
Morley, 1998; Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001;
Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Roberts & Sykes, 2003; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006),
which is a tendency on the part of the subject to reject or accept potential conclusions on
the basis of consistency with prior beliefs, regardless of logical status. Consider, for
example, the following problem (cf. Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983):
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No addictive things are inexpensive.
Some cigarettes are inexpensive.
-------------------------------------------Some cigarettes are not addictive. (5)
This syllogism is logically valid, but its conclusion is unbelievable. An example of the
converse, an invalid believable problem, would be as follows:
No addictive things are inexpensive.
Some cigarettes are inexpensive.
-------------------------------------------------*Some addictive things are not cigarettes. (6)
Belief bias effects are notoriously difficult to overcome, with even the most meticulous
and extensive logical instruction only serving to reduce, but not eliminate, the effect
(Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994).
Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) conducted an investigation into the belief bias
effect which was notable in that it ruled out the known structural factors (Revlis, 1975;
Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, & Yopp, 1980). Subjects were presented with four types of
arguments in which the validity and believability of the conclusion were crossed; they
were asked to judge whether the conclusion was valid. Conversion was controlled by
only using the logically convertible quantifiers 'Some' and 'No', and atmosphere was
controlled by only using 'Some...are not' conclusions, which are favored by the bias. In
two of the three experiments, figure was controlled for by using both Z-X and X-Z
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conclusions for each problem. In these experiments, only figures 2 and 3 were used, for
which Dickstein (1978) found no clear preference in terms of conclusion direction. The
design and results are summarized in Table 1.
Evans et al. (1983) obtained three effects which have since been replicated in a
number of studies. Subjects accepted more valid than invalid conclusions, and more
believable than unbelievable conclusions. Most importantly, there was an interaction
between logic and belief, such that the difference in acceptance of believable and
unbelievable problems was greater when problems were invalid than when they were
valid. The effect appears to stem from the very low acceptance rate of invalid
unbelievable problems, though the precise nature of the Evans et al. result is unclear. In
particular, it is not clear whether the effect is primarily due to logical processing preempted by belief status, belief-based responding pre-empted by logical status, or some
mixture of the two. As will soon be clear, explaining the interaction has been a major
goal of extant theories of belief bias.
Theories of Belief Bias
Selective Scrutiny
Several explanations of the findings in Evans et al. (1983) have been proposed.
The first of these was originally suggested by the authors themselves, and was
subsequently termed the selective scrutiny model. Selective scrutiny predicts that
subjects focus initially on the conclusion of the argument, and accept believable
conclusions without considering the logic of the argument. When conclusions are not
believable, subjects then reason through the premises and accept or reject conclusions on
the basis of their perceived logical validity. Selective scrutiny could thus be seen as a
8

process whereby logic-based responding is driven by the believability of conclusions
(belieflogic); the belief x logic interaction is accounted for in that reasoning only
occurs when syllogisms are unbelievable. While more recent work does appear to
support the idea that conclusion believability has an influence on the processing of
premises (e.g., Ball, Philips, Wade, & Quayle, 2006; Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004),
the theory by itself cannot account for main effects of logic on believable problems (see
Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000 for a meta-analysis).
Misinterpreted Necessity
A second theory proposed by Evans et al. (1983) that has since gained substantial
attention in the literature is the misinterpreted necessity model (Markovits & Nantel,
1989; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). Misinterpreted necessity predicts, in
contrast to selective scrutiny, that subjects will engage in reasoning at the outset, and only
rely on belief after reaching conclusions that are consistent with, but not necessitated by,
the premises. An example of this state of affairs is given by the following problem (7):
Some X are Y
No Z are Y
--------------------*Some Z are not X (7)
Specifically, subjects are said to misunderstand the notion of necessity, and to
become confused or uncertain when they are confronted with conclusions that they know
to be consistent with but not necessitated by the premises. Misinterpreted necessity, one
might argue, views belief-based responding as an escape-hatch mechanism
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(logicbelief), and provides a sensible explanation of the finding of increased sensitivity
to belief on invalid problems since the only problems that can lead to indeterminate
conclusions are by definition invalid ones.
Newstead et al. (1992) provided evidence both for and against misinterpreted
necessity. Across two initial experiments, they varied whether conclusions were
determinately or indeterminately invalid and only obtained the interaction when problems
were of the latter variety. In a third experiment, however, the logic x belief interaction
was not obtained despite the use of indeterminately invalid problems. The reason for this
apparent inconsistency will become clear shortly. A further weakness of the
misinterpreted necessity model is its inability to account for effects of belief on valid
problems (Klauer et al., 2000; Newstead et al., 1992).
Mental Models
A third theory of belief bias follows from the mental models framework originally
proposed by Johnson-Laird and colleagues (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Bara,
1984; Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). Mental models theories of belief bias (Oakhill
& Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989) generally assume
three basic stages in the processing of syllogisms. First, subjects construct a mental
representation that integrates the premises, the terms of which are described more or less
as mental tokens. Second, subjects check to see whether the conclusion is consistent with
the model they have constructed. If the conclusion is not consistent, it is rejected; if the
conclusion is consistent, the subject evaluates its believability. If a conclusion is
believable, it is accepted; if a conclusion is unbelievable, a third process is initiated the
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goal of which is to construct alternative models of the premises. If the conclusion is
consistent with all alternative models, it is accepted; if the conclusion is not consistent
with all models, it is rejected. Mental models theory essentially proposes that responses
result from a mixture of belief- and logic-based operations, rather than a single linear
relation. An illustration of this process is provided in Figure 2.
The mental models explanation can account for the fact that subjects are more
sensitive to belief on invalid problems. The theory classes problems according to the
number of possible models of the premises they allow; there are single- and multiplemodel problems. Specifically, the role of believability is that it biases the reasoning
process itself, such that construction of alternative models only occurs for unbelievable
problems, and this manifests itself as a greater effect of logic when problems are
unbelievable. A clear prediction of mental models is that the belief x logic interaction
will only occur for stimuli that allow the generation of alternative models (multiplemodel problems), irrespective of the determinacy status of the conclusion. This is the
manipulation carried out by Newstead et al. (1992) in experiment 3, mentioned above:
the stimuli were single-model, indeterminately invalid problems, and no interaction was
obtained, consistent with the mental models interpretation.
While mental models theory is compelling, it is important to note that it was
originally developed to explain conclusion production data, and as such it has been
argued by some researchers that it may not accurately characterize the evaluation
paradigm, which seems to require different processes and to inspire different biases. For
instance, Morley et al. (2004) evaluated the hypothesis that conclusion production
encourages 'forward’ reasoning (from premises to conclusion) while conclusion
11

evaluation encourages 'backward’ reasoning (the conclusion biases construal of the
premises). In a series of four experiments, Morley et al. demonstrated figural bias in the
absence of belief bias in a conclusion production task, while the opposite (belief bias in
the absence of figural bias) held for the conclusion evaluation task, consistent with their
claims. The authors suggested that a mental models account in which models of premises
are constructed can still apply, but that it would need to be modified to allow for effects
of conclusions on the construction of those models.
Mental models theory also suffers from the fact that the belief x logic interaction
has been obtained using one-model problems (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Klauer et al., 2000;
Oakhill et al., 1989). Oakhill et al. (1989) responded to this issue by affixing an ad hoc
conclusion filtering mechanism to their version of the mental models framework. In
other words, subjects may be processing syllogisms the way mental models predicts, but
in cases where conclusions are unbelievable subjects may still exhibit response biases
that operate secondarily to filter (reject) such conclusions. Even if one were to maintain
the conclusion filter, more recent findings from eyetracking (Ball et al., 2006) and
response time (Thompson et al., 2003) experiments have converged on the notion that
subjects actually spend more time processing believable and valid problems than
unbelievable and invalid ones, which is inconsistent with the alternative generation
account of the interaction. Though it could be argued that the above measures are
contaminated by wrap up effects (e.g. Hirotani, Frazier, & Rayner, 2006), it is clear that
the data so far do not clearly favor the mental models interpretation.
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Overall, it appears that though each of the theories may account for some of the
data, none of them provides a systematic account of all findings related to the belief bias
effect. A more general account may be found in dual-process theory, the third conception
alluded to by Evans et al. (1983).
Dual-Process Theory
Stanovich and West (2000) summarized and illustrated the influence of dualprocess theories, which have gained widespread attention in the reasoning literature (e.g.
Beller & Spada, 2003; Chater & Oaksford, 2001; Evans, 2003, 2007; Feeney, 2007;
Markovits & Schroyens, 2007; Shafir & LeBoeuf; 2002; Sloman, 1996). The authors
discussed a number of findings from a wide array of reasoning paradigms, and provided a
meta-theoretical summary of the conclusions reached by researchers in those areas.
Many of the conclusions are similar to one another in that they specify two mechanisms,
the characteristics of which appear to fall into distinct categories (see Table 2).
Stanovich and West referred to these categories as system 1 and system 2.
System 1 processes are characterized as fast-acting, heuristic-based, associative
processes. They are the 'quick and dirty' processes that often produce errors such as the
acceptance of fallacies in logical arguments. System 2 processes, on the other hand, are
slower, more analytic processes, and are thought to require decontextualized processing
which ignores or inhibits knowledge-based biases. Though the generality of Stanovich
and West's categorical distinction and the inclusion of the various theories subsumed by it
may be questioned, it is possible that a general framework such as this may apply to more
specific problems in the reasoning literature.
13

Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) evaluated dual-process theory as a potential
explanation of the belief bias effect. Specifically, the authors hypothesized system 1
processes to be driving belief-based responding, while system 2 processing was theorized
to drive logic-based responding. Belief bias, according to dual-process theory, is an
example of a conflict between these two systems of responding, and this is reflected in
the data as effects of belief and logic. A desirable state of affairs, then, is to create a set
of conditions that could potentially distinguish between the two systems. One possibility
is to constrain the operation of one system without necessarily hindering the other, e.g. by
asking subjects to make speeded decisions. This was the manipulation carried out by
Evans and Curtis-Holmes.
Subjects were divided into two groups: a deadline group and an unspeeded group.
The deadline group was given up to 10 seconds to respond to syllogisms of the sort used
by Evans et al. (1983). The authors argued that a 10 second deadline would be short
enough to effectively reduce analytical processing, citing a finding from Thompson,
Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, and Campbell (2003) that subjects average over 20 seconds to
evaluate similar problems. The second group was allowed unlimited time to evaluate the
same problems. Results are reproduced in Figure 3. The standard effects were obtained
in the unspeeded group, in line with the prediction of dual process theory that both
systems ought to contribute in the usual fashion. In the deadline group, however, there
were notable deviations from the usual findings. First, subjects were equally sensitive to
belief on valid and invalid problems, in line with the hypothesis that a logic-based
process was blocked by the deadline. Second, the deadline group was more sensitive to
belief than was the unspeeded group, indicating greater reliance on system 1. Finally,
14

subjects were less likely to discriminate between valid and invalid arguments in the
deadline group, in line again with the initial prediction. Evans and Curtis-Holmes
concluded that belief bias reflects the operation of two distinct systems of reasoning.
Neuroimaging data in favor of dual-process theory have also been obtained. Goel
and Dolan (2003) used an event-related fMRI procedure to scan subjects while they
evaluated syllogisms similar to those used by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005). The
imaging data were analyzed in terms of four trial types: belief-neutral (all responses to
problems with neutral content), belief-laden (all responses to believable and unbelievable
problems), correct inhibitory (correct responses to valid unbelievable and invalid
believable problems), and incorrect inhibitory (incorrect responses to valid unbelievable
and invalid believable problems). Results are illustrated in Figure 4. Goel and Dolan
found that trials in which logic and belief conflicted appeared to recruit executive control
processes, in that regions of the prefrontal cortex associated with inhibitory control were
activated, while those trials that did not entail conflict (belief-neutral trials) appeared to
rely primarily on regions of the parietal lobe. The authors concluded that two distinct,
dissociable systems appear to underlie responding in the belief bias task, consistent with
the predictions of dual-process theory.
Inductive Reasoning and Dual-Process Theory
The belief bias task, often studied in deductive reasoning paradigms such as
propositional (e.g. Markovits & Schroyens, 2007) and syllogistic reasoning, has also been
used to argue for fundamentally different inductive and deductive systems, both operating
on the processing of inductive stimuli (Rips, 2001). Rips' stimuli were conditional and
categorical induction problems that varied in inductive strength (believability) and
15

deductive correctness (validity). An example of a conflict problem similar to a syllogistic
invalid believable problem is an argument like the following:
Grizzlies hibernate during January.
------------------------------------------------*Black bears hibernate during January. (8)
An example of a facilitatory, valid believable induction problem is:
Grizzlies hibernate during January, and black bears hibernate during January.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Grizzlies hibernate during January. (9)
As described by Rips (2001), a unitary view of the reasoning process indicates a
single dimension of argument strength underlies the decisions subjects make; effects of
strength and correctness simply reflect a shift in the criterion subjects use to judge the
acceptability of arguments. For example, arguments judged by subjects to be valid or
deductively correct are those arguments whose strength surpasses a relatively high
criterion on the strength axis (see Figure 5). Arguments judged to be inductively strong
only require enough strength to pass a lower criterion. In other words, the unitary view
makes a prediction about the ordering of problems on the strength dimension in Figure 5:
A>B>C.
Rips (2001) attempted to modulate inductive and deductive responding by
manipulating instructions. One group of subjects received induction instructions which
stressed the plausibility of arguments, and asked that the reasoner evaluate the strength of
the arguments. A second group received deduction instructions which stressed the
concept of logical necessity and asked the reasoner to evaluate the validity of the
16

arguments (see Appendix A for actual instructions). All subjects were then presented
with categorical induction problems in which levels of the strength and correctness
factors were crossed. Figure 6A illustrates the results of Rips' experiment, a 3-way
interaction between logic, belief, and instructions. Considering the results for the
deduction group, Rips obtained a belief x logic interaction similar to the one found in
studies of belief bias, in that belief had a greater effect on incorrect arguments. Though
Rips did not directly compare the size of the interaction for induction and deduction, it
appears to be larger for the induction than for the deduction group. The difference in
effect size is due to a significant crossover effect on conflict problems: the deduction
group gave more positive responses to correct and inconsistent problems than for
incorrect and consistent ones (it depended primarily on deductive correctness), while the
opposite pattern emerged in the induction group (it depended primarily on inductive
strength). This finding, i.e., an inconsistent relationship between the groups on the same
problems, is contrary to the necessary prediction of the unitary view that problems be
ordered the same way on the strength dimension for both groups (A>B>C, Figure 5).
It is important to note that had the data not conformed to the ordering predicted by
Rips' (2001) unitary model, a unitary view might still have accounted for them so long as
that ordering was the same for the induction and deduction groups. The fact that the
relationship between the groups changes sign as a function of problem type (Figure 6B)
means the data fail to satisfy a necessary prediction of any single-process account: the
relationship between two groups that respond on the basis of the same underlying process
should be the same across all levels of a given predictor variable (Bamber, 1979). In
other words, the function relating induction and deduction should be monotonic if a
17

unitary view is correct. Rips rejected the unitary view and concluded inductive and
deductive responses reflect distinct systems of reasoning. The nonmonotonic relationship
reported by Rips lends weight to his conclusion as these analyses have been shown to
effectively distinguish single- from multiple-process accounts even in situations in which
other inferences based on functional dissociations can be misleading (Dunn & Kirsner,
1988).
Several questions arise if one accepts the view that two processes contribute to
human reasoning in the research reviewed above. One class of questions regards the
nature of the two systems. Is system 2 reasoning a continuous or an all-or-none process?
How does it differ from system 1 reasoning? Answering these questions may also
provide new information regarding the belief x logic interaction. For example, the
theories mentioned above highlight the question of whether the greater effect of belief for
invalid problems is actually due to logic-inspired belief-based responding, belief-inspired
logic-based responding, or some mixture. New information pertaining to the nature of
system 2 processing could be helpful in revealing whether there are particular patterns of
system-based responding. Fortunately, there exists a powerful framework for dealing
with this class of questions, one which has been largely neglected in the area of
reasoning. It is desirable, if one is to accept a dual-process account of human reasoning,
to obtain converging evidence by way of such a model.
Signal Detection Theory and ROC Analysis
In the area of recognition memory, a debate regarding whether a single- or dualprocess account provides the best description of subjects' behavior has been ongoing for
the past 30 years. Though the areas of memory and reasoning may be sufficiently distinct
18

from one another to warrant caution in making comparisons, the goal of this research is
not to generalize across these areas in terms of processes or specific theories. Rather, the
goal is to describe an inferential and descriptive model that has been shown to provide
important insights into the question of single- versus multiple-process accounts of
recognition, with the aim of extending its application to the area of human reasoning.
Briefly, the standard item recognition paradigm involves the presentation of a list
of words, followed by a test in which the subject must distinguish between previously
studied words and new words, or lures. The recognition experiment yields four types of
responses. If a test word is actually an old (previously studied) word, the subject's
response is either a 'hit' (an 'old’ response) or a 'miss' (a 'new' response). If a test word is
actually a new word (lure), the subject's response is either a 'correct rejection' (a 'new'
response) or a 'false alarm' (an 'old’ response). Much of the research using this and
related tasks has been guided by the use of signal detection theory, a theoretical and
inferential framework that began to impact memory theorists in the 1960s (see Banks,
1970 for review), and continues to have a profound influence on models and theories of
recognition to the present day (Kelly & Wixted, 2001; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder,
2004; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994).
In its most basic form, detection theory 1 posits that memory decisions reflect the
operation of a single, continuous 'memory strength' variable (see Figure 7). In the
memory experiment described above, the memory strength of old and new items is
1

Though detection theory may be extended to incorporate the operation of multiple continuous

processes (Kelly & Wixted, 2001; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004), 'signal detection theory' in
this writing will be used to refer solely to the more basic, univariate model.
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distributed normally, and the ability to distinguish between them reflects heightened
activation of old items (higher mean strength), as a result of recent study. The distance
between the distribution means provides an index of sensitivity, which can be calculated
using the d’ parameter. d’, assuming the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of
variance are met, is the difference between the z-transformed hit and false alarm rates of a
given subject or group of subjects, and is independent of response bias.
d’ = z(H) - z(F)
Response bias (willingness to say 'old’) can be measured in a number of ways (see
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005 for discussion), but the more common methods are all
related by the criterion placement parameter. Criterion placement, c, reflects bias relative
to the zero-bias point where the old and new item distributions cross over; liberal biases
(maximizing hits at the cost of increasing false alarms) reflect negative values of c, while
conservative biases (minimizing false alarms at the cost of a reduced hit rate) reflect
positive values of c.
c = -.5(z(H) + z(F))
As illustrated in Figure 7, area under the old item distribution to the right of the criterion
corresponds to the hit rate (H), while the area under the new item distribution to the right
of the criterion corresponds to the false alarm rate (F). The area of overlap between the
distributions reflects low sensitivity; the greater this area is relative to either distribution,
the lower overall sensitivity will become, regardless of criterion placement. The areas
under the old and new item distributions to the left of the criterion correspond to misses
(M) and correct rejections (CR), respectively.
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A powerful method for the evaluation of detection theory and other models, as
well as for checking the assumptions of a given model, is the analysis of receiveroperating characteristics, or ROCs. The ROC plots hit rate as a function of false alarm
rate at different levels of response bias. One very common method for collecting
empirical ROC data is to require subjects to follow their responses (e.g. ‘old’ or ‘new’)
with an indication of their confidence in the response on a rating scale. The ROC in
Figure 8 below was plotted using a 6-point confidence scale, in which a 1 corresponded
to 'sure old’ and a 6 corresponded to 'sure new.' As a rating of 1 corresponds to the most
stringent criterion for an 'old’ response, both the hit and false alarm rate should at this
point be lower than at any other point on the function. An important property of ROCs is
that they are cumulative, i.e., the (F, H) pair at 2 is the sum of hit and false alarm
proportions from confidence levels 1 and 2, the (F, H) pair at 3 is the sum of the
proportions from 1 to 3, and so forth. The cumulative nature of the 6-point ROC results
in a function with 5 points and an upper-x intercept at (1, 1).
The signal detection model, which assumes that normal, Gaussian distributions of
strength underlie rate of responding, can be used to generate theoretical ROCs for a given
level of sensitivity (isosensitivity curves). A 6-point ROC generated from such a model
yields a curvilinear ROC that is symmetrical about the minor diagonal (see figure).
Plotting the same ROC on z-coordinates reveals a linear function with a slope of 1, and
the difference between z(H) and z(F) at the most stringent point on the zROC will be
equivalent to d’ itself. In this way, sensitivity in the signal detection model is reflected
by the height of the ROC in x, y space; the distance between the ROC and the major
diagonal (which measures chance performance) increases as sensitivity increases.
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Response bias is reflected in the points on the ROC, which correspond to different
criteria on the strength axis; as one moves from a rating of 1 to 6, the criterion becomes
increasingly liberal (moves farther to left), increasing both H and F. In this way, points
on the same ROC reflect equal sensitivity but different levels of response bias. The
theoretical ROC implied by signal detection theory, with its distinctive curvilinearity,
was shown by researchers in the early decades of the tradition to provide a better fit to
empirical ROCs than did other model-implied ROCs, such as those implied by threshold
theory (e.g. Egan, 1958; Green & Swets, 1966).
The slope of the zROC, which is equal to the ratio of new and old item standard
deviations (σ n /σ o ), can be used to make inferences about the variances of strength
distributions (Figure 9). Assuming, e.g., σ n is static, the slope of the ROC will decrease
(or increase) as σ o increases (or decreases). In memory experiments, zROC slope is often
less than one (Glanzer, Kim, Halford, & Adams, 1999; Heathcote, 2003; Ratcliff, Sheu,
& Gronlund, 1992; Ratcliff, McKoon, & Tindall, 1994). A series of item recognition
experiments by Ratcliff et al. (1994), for instance, varied rate of presentation, list length,
word frequency, presentation duration, and semantic similarity and found that in almost
every instance zROC slope remained constant at about .80. More recent experiments by
Glanzer et al. (1999) and Heathcote (2003) also varied depth of encoding, number of
repetitions, semantic concreteness, categorical relatedness, orthographic similarity, and
category length (number of related words). The results from many of these experiments
indicated that as recognition accuracy increases, slope decreases.
Effects on ROC indices such as slope or height across experimental conditions are
consistent with multiple-process models like the one suggested by Rips (2001). In fact,
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in the memory literature slope effects were argued by Yonelinas (1994) to reflect the
contribution of two qualitatively different memory processes to distributions of memory
strength. In Yonelinas’ (1994) dual-process framework, recollection, i.e., the retrieval of
specific details related to the memory probe, is modeled as an all-or-none threshold
component that is highly accurate and should only contribute to high-confidence memory
judgments. At test, old items either pass a threshold and are recollected or they fail to do
so and a second, strength-based signal detection process is used to output a decision.
Strength-based decreases in slope, then, are said to reflect a growing subset of items
whose strength has been boosted past the recollection threshold. This subset would
produce a right-skewed old item distribution, decreasing σ n /σ o . Though the dual-process
model remains very controversial (see Wixted, 2007, for review), it nonetheless serves to
illustrate the importance of ROC indices in providing a window onto underlying
processes.
Similar inferences can be made by applying signal detection and ROC analysis to
reasoning data. In this case, parameters that memory theorists use to describe the
strength of old and new items are used to describe the strength of valid and invalid
arguments. The slope of the zROC, then, reflects the ratio of σ invalid to σ valid . It is
desirable to know whether slope will change in response to manipulations directed at
system-based responding, as such differences could indicate a qualitative change in the
form of the argument strength distributions. If, for instance, greater effects of belief on
invalid problems result from a unique mixture of logic- and belief-based responding
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acting on invalid unbelievable arguments, this mixture might be expected to selectively
affect the variance of invalid unbelievable arguments. Such effects would be reflected in
a change in slope relative to zROC slope for neutral or believable problems.
An additional concern that applies regardless of the particular paradigm one
works with is whether the assumptions of a given model have been met. Specifically,
without recourse to ROCs one may adopt equal-variance parameters when the data do not
support that model's assumptions; this can greatly elevate the risk of committing a type I
error (Rotello, Masson, & Verde, 2008). In the (frequently occurring) event that ROCs
indicate the equal-variance assumption has been violated, an unequal-variance signal
detection framework can be adopted. In this case the measures d a and c a may be
substituted for d’ and c, respectively. The unequal variance parameters are obtained by
weighting d’ and c by s, the standard deviation of the lure distribution (for derivation, see
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
da = [2/(1 + s^2)]^1/2 [z(H) - sz(F)]
c a = [(-√2)s]/[(1 + s^2)^1/2(1 + s)] [z(H) + z(F)]
A synthesis: Heit and Rotello (2005)
Heit and Rotello (2005) reported two experiments conducted with the aim of
further evaluating Rips' (2001) dual-process conception of inductive reasoning using
ROC methodology. In experiment 1, Heit and Rotello replicated Rips' experiment:
subjects were given either induction or deduction instructions, and both groups received
categorical induction problems that varied in inductive strength and deductive
correctness. After each response, subjects were required to rate how confident they were
in their responses on a 7-point scale.
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The zROC results of experiment 1, which also replicated Rips' main findings, are
reproduced in Figure 10A. Both H (P('valid’ response|valid item)) and F (P('valid’
response|invalid item)) were higher in the induction than in the deduction group,
indicating a more liberal response bias. The bias effect is reflected in the ROCs: points
on the deduction function are clustered downward and leftward relative to the position of
points on the induction function. There was also a slope difference; slope for the
deduction function was higher (.84) than for the induction function (.60). Finally,
analysis of d’ revealed a sensitivity difference: d’ was higher in the deduction than the
induction group; the authors note the same conclusion was reached with the unequalvariance measure d a . The sensitivity effect is reflected in the ROCs as well: the
deduction function is higher in the space (further from the origin) than is the induction
function. Of the three effects demonstrated by Heit and Rotello, the unitary view
described by Rips (2001) can only predict the bias effect, i.e., that the deduction group
would have a higher criterion on an argument strength dimension. It cannot account for
differences in sensitivity and bias; the results therefore appear to weigh in favor of the
dual-process approach.
Experiment 2 extended the initial findings by replacing the inductive strength
variable with a typicality manipulation. Generally speaking, the typicality effect
(Sloman, 1993; 1998) is the finding of reduced acceptance of conclusions involving
atypical, relative to typical, exemplars. For instance, the argument 'All birds have
property C, therefore All robins have property C' is endorsed more frequently than the
argument 'All birds have property C, therefore all penguins have property C.' As can be
seen in Figure 10B, the results were consistent with those of the previous experiment.
25

There was a main effect of typicality which did not interact with group or deductive
correctness. Analysis of H and F, and visual inspection of the ROCs, again revealed
more liberal responding in the induction group; sensitivity, as measured by d’ and in
terms of relative distance of the ROCs from the origin, was higher in the deduction than
in the induction group; zROC slope was higher in the deduction group than the induction
group (.82 vs. .71). Having replicated and extended the results of their first experiment,
Heit and Rotello concluded their findings could not be accounted for by a criterion shift
as effects on sensitivity and slope were also obtained.
The results of these initial experiments from Heit and Rotello (2005) are
important for several reasons. First, they demonstrate the power of ROC analysis as a
window onto underlying processes in human reasoning; second, they illustrate the
generalizability of models based on the well-established signal detection framework;
third, they cross subfields to demonstrate systematization of findings which, according to
some philosophers of science (e.g. Sidman, 1960), is essential in that it allows the
possibility of accounting for many seemingly unrelated effects with a relatively small
number of experiments. One question that remains, however, is whether the same
approach used in Heit and Rotello (2005) will yield analogous findings in the area of
deductive reasoning. Specifically, it is unclear whether the results obtained with
categorical induction stimuli will generalize to tasks that use deductive stimuli. What can
ROC curves tell us about the processes underlying performance in syllogistic reasoning
tasks? Can manipulations similar to those used by Rips (2001) and Heit and Rotello
(2005) be used to tease apart the contributions of system 1 and system 2 to responding in
the belief bias task?
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The goal of the following experiments is to determine whether the behavior of
subjects in the belief bias syllogism evaluation task is best described in terms of a singleor a dual-process theory of human reasoning. The goal of experiment 1 is to replicate
and extend the experiment reported by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), in which a
response deadline manipulation was used in an attempt to dissociate system-based
responding. The goal of experiment 2 will be to determine whether the effects of
induction and deduction instructions demonstrated by Rips (2001), and by Heit and
Rotello (2005), generalize to syllogistic reasoning. All manipulations will proceed from
the notion that two reasoning systems exist, and that conditions can be created that are
more conducive to a given mode of responding.
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Figure 1. The Four Syllogistic Figures.

Table 1
Design and Acceptance Rates From Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983), Experiment 1;
Adapted From Klauer et al. (2000).
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Figure 2. The Mental Models Account of Belief Bias (Adapted From Klauer
et al., 2000).

29

Table 2
Dual-Process Theories and Their Attributes in Stanovich and West (2000)
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Percentage of Conclusions Accepted

Problem Type
Figure 3. Percentage Acceptance as a Function of Problem Type in Evans and CurtisHolmes (2005). V indicates valid problems, I invalid problems, B believable problems,
and U unbelievable problems.
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Figure 4. Neuroimaging Results From Goel and Dolan (2003). A) Belief-neutral
reasoning (all responses to neutral content); scan indicates activation of the superior
parietal lobule. B) Belief-laden reasoning (all responses to belief-laden content); scan
indicates activation of the left pole of the middle temporal gyrus. C) Correct inhibitory
trials (correct responses to valid unbelievable and invalid believable problems; scan
indicates activation of right inferior prefrontal cortex. D) Incorrect inhibitory trials
(incorrect responses to valid unbelievable and invalid believable problems; scan indicates
activation of ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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B

A

Figure 5. A One-Dimensional Account of Categorical Induction (cf. Rips, 2001). A) Believable Valid
argument; B) believable invalid argument; C) unbelievable invalid argument. Vertical lines represent
decision criteria, the rightmost being the more stringent position. The one-dimensional model posits
acceptance and rejection of conclusions is the result of a criterion shift, and that the ordering of problems
that combine believability and validity is A>B>C.
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Figure 6. Results From Rips (2001). A) Proportion acceptance for induction and
deduction as a function of problem type. B) Proportion acceptance for deduction (Y axis)
plotted against induction (X axis); the relationship between induction and deduction
changes sign as a function of stimulus, indicating a nonmonotonic relationship between
the groups.

34

Figure 7. The Equal-Variance Signal Detection Model. The strength of items in memory
is asumed to be distributed normally. The distribution of recently studied items is
displaced to the right of new (lure) items, reflecting higher memory strength. Subjects
differ in terms of willingness to say ‘Old’; this is modeled as a criterion dividing items
into the response categories ‘Old’ and ‘New’ on the basis of their strength. The hit and
false alarm rates correspond to the area under the respective old and new item
distributions that falls to the right of the criterion. The distance between old and new
distributions is a measure of sensitivity (d’) that is independent of response bias (criterion
placement).
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Figure 8. ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curves (Adapted From Macmillan
and Creelman, 2005). A) ROCs plot hit rate (H) against false alarm rate (F) as a function
of confidence. ROCs are cumulative, such that the (F, H) pair at a given point is the sum
of F and H at every level of confidence up to and including that point. The distance
between the ROC and the major diagonal is an index of sensitivity. The relative position
of operating points on the ROC is an index of response bias; on the same curve, a ‘1’ is a
more stringent response than a ‘2.’ B) The relationship between ratings and response
bias can be understood in terms of detection theory: ratings reflect different response
criteria, with a rating of ‘1’ corresponding to the most stringent criterion in panel B.
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Figure 9. Unequal-Variance Detection Theory (Adapted From Macmillan and Creelman,
2005). A) Linear zROC with nonunit slope; B) Unequal-variance detection theory
consistent with nonunit slope in A.
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Figure 10. zROCs From Heit and Rotello (2005). A) Results from experiment 1 indicate
effects of instructions on sensitivity, bias, and zROC slope. B) Similar results from
experiment 2.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD AND RESULTS
Experiment 1
The present experiment, an extension of the study reported by Evans and CurtisHolmes (2005), used ROC analysis to further investigate differences in system-based
responding, as well as to provide information complementary to data obtained by
contrasting hits and false alarms. In addition to the 10 second and unspeeded conditions
of the previous study, there was a third condition in which subjects had 1 minute to
respond. The inclusion of the long deadline group allowed us to assess the effect of the
time limit itself. Specifically, it is possible that simply imposing a deadline is sufficient
to substantially alter behavior on the whole, rather than blocking or limiting a constituent
element of that behavior (i.e., system 2 reasoning). If, for example, subjects run out of
time and are forced to guess or miss a deadline on one or two trials, it may inspire
guessing and rapid responding on the following trials regardless of the amount of time it
would actually take to reason through the problem, artifactually producing effects similar
to those observed in the above study.
Method
Subjects
Experiment 1 included 119 subjects. All subjects were psychology
undergraduates from the University of Massachusetts, and received course credit for their
participation.
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Design
Experiment 1 used a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design. All subjects evaluated the validity of
32 syllogisms differing in logical status and believability of the conclusion; they received
8 valid believable, 8 valid unbelievable, 8 invalid believable, and 8 invalid unbelievable
syllogisms. Subjects were divided into three groups: a short deadline group (n=39), in
which subjects had 10 seconds to make the evaluation decision, a long deadline group
(n=38), in which subjects had 1 minute to make the response, and an unspeeded group on
which no time limit was imposed (n=42).
ROCs were derived by requiring each response to be followed by a confidence
rating on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 was ‘Not at all confident’ and 3 was ‘Very confident.'
As the same scale was used twice (once for each response), the ROCs were plotted using
6 levels of confidence, resulting in functions with 5 points. Note that although it could be
argued that confidence judgments formulated following speeded decisions may reflect the
contribution of post-decisional processing, Baranski and Petrusic (1998) have
demonstrated that the time taken to determine confidence under deadline conditions is
unlikely to reflect the extraction of new information from the stimulus in memory.
Stimuli
Subjects evaluated 32 syllogisms. The full set of problems was comprised of two
subsets, each containing equal numbers of valid and invalid problems. Set A included 8
structures that fully control for atmosphere, conversion, and figural effects. As in Evans,
Barston, and Pollard (1983), atmosphere and conversion were controlled in Set A by
using both invalid and valid forms of problems using the logically convertible premise
quantifiers ‘Some’ and ‘No’, and conclusion quantifier ‘Some…are not’ which is favored
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by the premise atmosphere of ‘Some’ and ‘No.’ Figures 2-4 were used, and figural
effects were controlled for by presenting conclusions for figure 4 in directions both
preferred and nonpreferred by the bias, at both levels of validity. Set B contained 8
additional structures for which atmosphere and figure were controlled as in Set A, but
each problem allowed illicit conversion. Although the premise quantifiers were
convertible, the effect of conversion for these particular problems is unlikely to produce
artifactual belief bias effects as, unlike the original problem set examined by conversion
theorists (e.g. Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, & Yopp, 1980), the converted versions of each
problem lead to the same response. Premise quantifiers ‘All’, ‘No’, and ‘Some…are not’
were used, in figures 2 and 3; like Set A, all problems used ‘Some…are not’ conclusions
(for the actual structures, see Appendix C).
The 8 problems in each set were repeated twice each, once with a believable
conclusion and once with an unbelievable conclusion, yielding the full set of 32
problems. Problem content for 13 problems was taken from a previous study by Morley
et al. (2004); new content was used for the remaining 19 problems. All sets of content
were randomly assigned to the 32 problem structures. For the new content, conclusion
believability was rated previously by a group of 59 psychology undergraduates at the
University of Massachusetts in Amherst, using a scale from 1 to 5 where a 1
corresponded to ‘unbelievable’, a 3 corresponded to ‘neutral’, and a 5 corresponded to
‘believable.’ The most extreme ratings were then selected to construct the present set of
stimuli. The conclusions, along with means and standard deviations, are presented in
Appendix B. All content was chosen such that conclusions related a statement about a
category-exemplar relationship between subject and predicate terms. In order to
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minimize the effects of premise believability, subject and predicate terms were linked via
an esoteric middle term (e.g. ‘No sculptors are hammerkops/Some hammerkops are not
artists’).
Content was counterbalanced such that it appeared in both believable and
unbelievable, and both valid and invalid structures. Between subjects, modulation of
belief status was accomplished by reversing the order of assignment of words to the
subject and predicate positions. In other words, for each subject that received the
conclusion ‘Some spiders are not insects’, an equal number received the conclusion
‘Some insects are not spiders’, while no subject received both. Further, for each of the 16
structures the actual believable or unbelievable content was also varied.
Counterbalancing thus yielded 4 subsets of 32 problems.
Finally, practice problems used in experiment 1 (see Procedure) included esoteric
predicate terms in order to create belief-neutral conclusions (e.g. ‘Some cowboys are
theurgists’).
Procedure
All subjects were tested individually and were seated approximately two feet in
front of a computer monitor. During an initial preparation phase, deduction instructions
were read to the subject who was then shown three neutral example problems (two valid
problems and one invalid) and asked to reiterate in his or her own words the meaning of
the terms valid and invalid. Instructions and preparation materials are listed in Appendix
D.
The procedure for the unspeeded group was as follows: upon completion of the
preparation phase subjects received a welcome message; once the message had been read
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the subject advanced the experiment via key-press. Next, deduction instructions were
displayed, followed by the message “Before we start the experiment, let’s try a few
practice trials. Press any key to begin practice.” Once subjects advanced the message, a
syllogism was presented, followed by the response options 'Not valid’ or 'Valid.'
Subjects indicated their response via key-press (F for 'Not valid’ or J for 'Valid’). Once
the evaluation response was made, a new screen containing the question “How confident
are you in this judgment?” appeared, along with a description (“1 = Not at all confident, 2
= Moderately confident, 3 = Very confident”) and the instructions “Press key: 1 2 3.”
Once the confidence response was made, the process repeated for the remaining 4
syllogisms. Practice problems were concrete but contained neutral content (see Stimuli).
Upon termination of the practice session, there was an intermission message informing
subjects that they could take a quick break and to advance to the experimental trials via
key-press. Experimental trials proceeded in the same manner as the practice trials, but
contained a new set of 32 belief-laden syllogisms (see Stimuli). Order of presentation for
the 5 practice problems and 32 experimental problems was completely randomized for
each subject.
In the short deadline group, the same procedure was followed as in the unspeeded
group, but with the following changes. All on-screen instructions were augmented to
explain the deadline procedure. In addition, the practice trials of the unspeeded group
were replaced by a series of 5 trials using the deadline procedure (see Appendix E for
deadline instructions). The procedure followed closely that of Evans and Curtis-Holmes
(2005). On a given deadline trial, only the premises (and the line) of the syllogism were
presented for the first 5 seconds of the trial, followed by presentation of the conclusion
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below the premises for an additional 5 seconds. A time clock appeared at the start of
each trial, counting backward from 10 seconds in 1 second intervals. If and when the
clock reached the final second, the timer was replaced by the message “make a decision
now.” Subjects who failed to make a decision before the termination of the final second
were advanced to the next trial and no response was recorded for the missed trial. Once
the evaluation decision was made, subjects were advanced to a new screen asking for a
confidence rating. Confidence ratings were unspeeded, and this was indicated in the
instructions.
Following completion of the training phase, subjects received the intermission
message indicating completion, as in the unspeeded group. This was followed by the first
experimental trial, which involved the same procedure as in the training trials and
repeated for the full set of 32 syllogisms.
The procedure for the long deadline group was the same as that of the short
deadline group, with two exceptions. One exception is that the premises and conclusion
were presented simultaneously, in order to render conditions comparable to the
unspeeded group, which follows the more traditional design of belief bias experiments.
These conditions were appropriate for assessing the effect of imposing a long deadline
relative to standard conditions in which no deadline is imposed. The other exception is
that the time clock counted backward from 60 seconds, which was also reflected in the
instructions.
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Results
Proportion of Deadlines Missed
One limitation of the study reported by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) is that
the effect of missed trials in the 10 second condition is not known. In order to assess the
effect in the present study, for each subject the proportion of trials in which the deadline
was missed (P(M)) was calculated. With one outlier excluded (P(M) = .31)), the data
were normally distributed with mean = .08 (approximately 3 trials missed) and SD = .06
(approximately 2 trials missed). P(M) was not influenced by whether problems were
believable or not (t(37) = .896, p = .376) or by whether they were valid or not (t(37) =
0.000, p > .05). The data were then split at the median, with subjects below the median
assigned to a 'low missed' group and those above the median assigned to a 'high missed'
group. A 2 (group: high vs. low) x 2 (logical status) x 2 (believability) mixed ANOVA
indicated no interaction between the effects of logic or belief with group on P(M) (F(1,
36) = 0.000, MSE = .007, p > .05, and F(1, 36) = .050, MSE = .013, p > .05, respectively).
Finally, the analyses reported below were conducted both with and without the high
missed group, and both with and without the outlier for whom P(M) = .31. As none of
the conclusions reached by analysis of the full sample were affected by either of these
variables, it was concluded that subjects were randomly missing relatively small numbers
of trials. The analyses reported below were conducted on the full sample.
Hits and False Alarms
The proportion of conclusions accepted was analyzed using a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed
ANOVA with logic and belief as within-subjects factors and group as a between-subjects
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factor. Interactions were examined using paired comparisons, which were Bonferronicorrected in order to minimize the contribution of familywise error.
Results for hits and false alarms (summarized in Table 3) imply the standard
belief bias effect. First, there was a main effect of logic, indicating greater acceptance
rates for valid than invalid problems, F(1,116) = 184.968, MSE = .044, p<.001. Second,
there was a main effect of belief, indicating greater acceptance rates for believable than
unbelievable problems, F(1,116) = 73.126, MSE = .043, p<.001. Third, there was a logic
x belief interaction, indicating a greater effect of belief for invalid than for valid
problems, F(1,116) = 12.402, MSE = .026, p<.01.
Group and logical status also interacted, F(2,116) = 8.615, MSE = .044, p<.001.
Paired comparisons revealed the logic index (H – F) was larger in the unspeeded than the
10 second group, t(116) = 3.494, p<.01, and the same relation held for the 60 second
relative to the 10 second group, t(116) = 3.687, p<.01. The 60 second and unspeeded
groups did not differ in sensitivity to logical status, t(116) = .308, p>.05. There was also
an interaction between group and belief, F(2, 116) = 7.164, MSE = .043, p<.01; the belief
index (P(“Valid”|Believable) – P(“Valid”|Unbelievable)) was marginally larger in the 10
second than the unspeeded group, t(116) = 2.423, p = .051, and the same relation held for
the 10 second relative to the 60 second group, t(116) = 3.715, p<.01. The 60 second and
unspeeded groups did not differ in sensitivity to belief, t(116) = 1.397, p>.05.
Finally, no 3-way interaction was obtained, indicating that the interaction between
logic and belief was comparable across the three groups, F(2, 116) = 1.264, MSE = .026,
p = .286. Though this aspect of the data was not consistent with the results of Evans and
Curtis-Holmes (2001), it should be noted that conflicting results have been previously
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reported by Shynkaruk and Thompson (2006), implying that the problem might not lie
with dual-process theory, but with theorists' interpretations of the interaction in general
(see General Discussion). With the exception of the null belief x logic x group result, the
results for H and F are thus consistent with the data reported by Evans and Curtis-Holmes
(2001), and suggest that imposing a deadline, in and of itself, does not substantially alter
responding.
ROC Analyses
Testing for apparent differences in ROCs using detection theory parameters
requires correcting for H=1 and F=0, and as recognition experiments typically avoid
these levels of responding, corrections can be made that do not substantially impact the
results of significance tests. However, the belief bias effect in the present experiment
produced unusually large numbers of potential corrections (22% of believable hits and
false alarms; 13% of unbelievable hits and false alarms). As a result of this issue,
parameter tests were not included in this analysis and it was necessary instead to directly
compare the functions. ROCs are plotted in Figures 11-13. Gray lines indicate the upper
and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for each (bold) group ROC.
Confidence intervals were obtained by bootstrapping 2000 samples from the individual
data and selecting group ROCs falling at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the resulting
distribution. To more closely examine the effects of logic and belief, two types of ROCs
were plotted. Logic ROCs plot hits against false alarms, where the hit rate is defined as
P(“Valid”|Valid) and the false alarm rate is defined as P(“Valid”|Invalid). Belief ROCs
plot hits against false alarms, where the hit rate is defined as P(“Valid”|Believable) and
the false alarm rate is defined as P(“Valid”|Unbelievable).
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The main effect of logic is reflected in plot 11A; the chance line is below the
lower bound of the 95% CI for the logic ROC. Plot 11B reflects the main effect of belief;
the chance line is below the lower bound of the CI for the belief ROC. Interestingly, the
robust belief x logic interaction obtained with the measure H-F was not replicated in the
ROCs (Figure 11C). The confidence interval of the logic ROC for believable problems
overlaps with the confidence interval of the unbelievable logic ROC. Though decisive
conclusions regarding the appropriate sensitivity statistic cannot be drawn without fitting
models assumed by those statistics to the observed ROCs, the absence of an effect in
ROC height indicates H-F is not an appropriate measure of sensitivity for this task.
To further clarify the measurement discrepancy, ROCs implied by H - F have
been superimposed on the observed ROCs in Figure 11D. The ‘interaction index’ used in
studies of belief bias is a contrast of the logic index (H - F) for unbelievable and
believable problems (HU - FU - HB + FB); this is the equivalent of a contrast of f(x) for
the lines intersecting the (F, H) pair at the midpoint of the corresponding ROCs, for a
single value of x. The midpoints of the ROCs yield the group average of F and H for
problems that are believable (.63, .84) and unbelievable (.42, .73), which can also be
obtained using the averages from Table 3. The difference in f(x) between these functions
for any single point along the x-axis is always .10, the value of the interaction index,
though the difference in f(x) for the observed ROCs at a single value of x is not constant
at all values of x. The ROCs implied by H - F do not appear to map on to the observed
ROCs and are thus unlikely to provide an accurate measurement of the interaction
between logic and belief.
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Figures 11C-D also indicate a marked shift in response bias: the position of
operating points is upward and rightward for the believable relative to the unbelievable
ROC. This is another reflection of the belief bias apparent in 11B, which implies
furthermore that the conditions under which belief bias is typically obtained are also just
the conditions under which H-F is likely to lead one to erroneous conclusions (i.e. when
response biases differ; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Rotello, Masson, & Verde, 2008).
The slope of the zROC also appears to be greater for believable logic (.97) than
unbelievable logic (.81); this is consistent with the notion that the argument strength
distribution containing conflict problems (where belief and logic disagree) will be more
variable than the distribution containing facilitatory problems (where belief and logic
agree). For the believable ROC, one might expect the invalid item distribution to be
more variable than the valid item distribution, raising the slope relative to the
unbelievable ROC, which might be expected to reflect less variability in the invalid than
in the valid distribution, yielding slope = .81.
The interaction between the effects of logic and group is shown in Figures 12A-C.
While the confidence intervals for the logic ROCs of the 60 second and unspeeded
groups overlap (12C), the function for each group is higher in x-y space than the function
for the 10 second group (12A-B), indicating relatively lower sensitivity to logical status
in the 10 second group.
The interaction between belief and group is illustrated in Figures 13A-C. While
the confidence intervals for the belief ROCs of the 60 second and unspeeded groups
overlap (13C), the function for the 10 second group is higher in the space than the
function for each of the other groups (13A-B). In all cases, zROC slope exceeds 1,
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indicating the variance differential for belief ROCs is opposite that of the logic ROC
(slope = .89 for logic, 1.19 for belief). Again, this can be readily explained in terms of
the inclusion of conflict items in the distributions the ROCs are thought to reflect.
Specifically, if the variance of valid unbelievable argument strength is great enough to
exceed that of the other three argument types, then one would expect relatively high slope
estimates when those arguments are treated as comprising part of the noise distribution
(belief ROCs), while slope would be correspondingly lower when the same arguments
are treated as comprising part of the signal distribution (logic ROCs).
Perhaps the most interesting result in terms of the form of the ROCs can be seen
in the belief ROC for the 10 second group. In the logic ROCs of the 60 second and
unspeeded groups, where system 2 reasoning should predominate, there is a suggestion of
two-piece linearity that seems to be entirely absent in the more curvilinear belief ROC of
the 10 second group. If one assumes the contributions of system 1 and system 2 are
reflected in the logic and belief indices, then the appropriate ROC-based equivalents for
assessing these factors would be the logic and belief functions. Furthermore, if system 1
responding does predominate in the 10 second group, and the belief ROC to some degree
reflects that contribution, then the ROCs suggest system 1 might be better characterized
as a continuous process like that assumed by the detection theory model, while the
contribution of system 2 might be better approximated by a threshold model assuming
two or more discrete states. Until further work is directed at fitting such models to these
data, however, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the belief and logic ROCs,
when they are substantially above the chance line, appear to differ in form.
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Discussion
The results for ROCs and H - F are generally in accordance, and the findings of
increases in logic- and decreases in belief-based responding with extra time reported by
Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) were replicated. The inverse relationship between
belief- and logic-based responding over time cannot be explained by a single-process
account, such as the one detailed by Rips (2001). The one-process view could only have
predicted a reduction in overall accuracy (i.e. only one latent variable, with its own time
course, would have been manipulated) and/or a more liberal or conservative criterion
with increased time pressure. The results are consistent with the notion that imposing a
short deadline blocks the contribution of system 2, thereby eliminating opportunities for
analytic processes to override the conclusions of erroneous, fast-acting heuristic
processes. Imposing a (long) deadline or missing deadlines does not appear to
substantially affect how subjects respond.
The finding of an increase in the interaction between belief and logic with time
was not replicated, however. A related finding was that the robust belief x logic
interaction obtained by contrasting H and F was not replicated in the ROCs. The form of
the ROCs suggests a model different from the one implied by H - F (a straight line of unit
slope), which raises questions regarding the statistical and theoretical significance of the
interaction originally reported by Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983). However, the use
of a relatively stringent instruction phase, as well as the existence of conflicting results
regarding the interaction and its interpretation (see General Discussion), indicate more
work is needed before any decisive conclusions about the interaction and its theoretical
implications can be reached. Finally, the finding of apparent differences in the form of
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the belief and logic ROCs supports dual-process theory, though firm conclusions must
await the application of models which assume fundamentally different processes.

Experiment 2
The goal of experiment 2 was to determine whether the effects of induction and
deduction instructions demonstrated by Rips (2001), and by Heit and Rotello (2005),
would generalize to syllogistic reasoning. In addition to the belief bias task used in
experiment 1, a control condition was included in which both instruction groups solved a
block of abstract syllogisms. Though effects of induction and deduction were not
expected for the abstract block, the question remained as to whether subjects in the belief
bias task would rely on two processes to respond to a given stimulus, or whether they
would rely on a single process to combine information from two stimulus attributes, i.e.,
the logical status and believability of a given problem. We entertained the possibility of
effects of induction and deduction for abstract problems, assuming such results would
provide convincing evidence in favor of dual-process theory, while acknowledging that
the lack of an effect would still be consistent with the commonsense notion that abstract
problems can only be solved using system 2 reasoning.
The inclusion of the abstract block served two further purposes. First and
foremost, it was hoped that the form of the abstract ROC might be useful to future
research by providing information about the nature of logic-based processing, in addition
to serving as a comparator for belief-laden ROCs. Secondly, the inclusion of abstract and
belief-laden ROCs in experiment 2 allowed an additional question to be addressed: could
the solution of abstract syllogisms have an effect on system-based responding? There is
some evidence in the developmental literature that suggests it could (Hawkins, Pea,
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Glick, & Scribner, 1984; Markovits & Vachon, 1989; 1990). For instance, Hawkins et al.
(1984) presented 4-5 year old children with syllogisms containing either fantasy or
realistic content (content invoking knowledge about the world) and found that when
fantasy problems were solved prior to realistic problems, performance overall was better
than when the order was reversed. In addition, coded 'justification' data revealed that the
fantasy-first group provided more theoretical (logically deductive) justifications on both
problem types than did the other groups. Hawkins et al. concluded that “A theoretical or
abstract attitude toward the verbal problems appears to have been made possible because
the fantasy problems were constituted of premises isolated from practical knowledge,” (p.
592). It was uncertain whether this effect would generalize to adults or whether an
'abstract attitude' might reflect system 2 processing, but as one of the main questions of
experiment 2 required the collection of abstract ROCs, it was relatively easy to test for
this effect in adults.
Method
Subjects
Experiment 2 included 122 subjects. All subjects were psychology
undergraduates from the University of Massachusetts, and received course credit for their
participation.
Design
Experiment 2 used a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design. Subjects evaluated the same set
of 32 syllogisms as in experiment 1. Subjects were divided into two groups; 61 subjects
received induction instructions and the other 61 received deduction instructions (see
Appendix A for actual instructions). Subjects in each group were subdivided into an
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abstract and a belief-only group. The abstract group (n = 59) evaluated a block of 16
syllogisms containing letters in place of words for the subject, predicate, and middle
terms; following the abstract block, subjects received a block of 32 stimuli containing
words as in experiment 1. The belief only group (n = 63) received only the block of 32
concrete syllogisms.
Stimuli
Details regarding syllogisms used in experiment 2 are the same as those for
experiment 1, with the exception that all problem structures were presented three times to
half of the subjects: once in believable, unbelievable, and abstract forms. Abstract
versions of the 16 structures were created by randomly selecting a set of 24 letters from
the alphabet, each of which was randomly assigned two times to the terms of the
syllogisms, with the constraints that no two letters shared a problem more than once, and
that no letter was repeated in a given problem.
Procedure
All subjects were tested individually and were seated approximately two feet in
front of a computer monitor. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
deduction/abstract (n = 31), deduction/belief only (n = 30), induction/abstract (n = 28),
induction/belief only (n = 33). There was an initial preparation phase during which
deduction or induction instructions were read to the subject who was then shown three
neutral example problems (two valid/strong problems and one invalid/not strong) and
asked to reiterate in his/her own words the meaning of the terms Valid/Invalid or
Strong/Not strong. All subjects were then asked to complete three practice problems and
indicate the confidence of their responses on a scale of 1 to 3 where a 1 corresponded to
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low confidence in the response and a 3 corresponded to high confidence. Practice
materials are listed in Appendix F.
Subjects in the abstract groups evaluated a block of 16 abstract syllogisms the
terms of which contained letters of the alphabet in place of words. The procedure in this
case was similar to the unspeeded condition of experiment 1: instructions (in this case,
induction or deduction) were presented on-screen, followed by a syllogism and the
response option “Not valid (F) or Valid (J),” followed by a confidence rating on a scale
of 1 to 3, where a 1 indicated “Not at all confident” and a 3 indicated “Very confident.”
There was then an optional, untimed rest interval; this was followed by a second block of
32 experimental trials using a similar set of concrete syllogisms (see Stimuli for details).
The sequence of events for the second block of trials was the same as that of the previous
block.
Subjects in the belief only groups underwent the same procedure as the abstract
group with the exception that they only completed one block of 32 stimuli; these were the
same syllogisms as those used in the second block of the abstract condition.
Results
Hits and False Alarms
Hits and false alarms are summarized in Tables 3-4. For abstract problems, the
logic index (H – F) did not differ as a function of instructions, t(57) = 1.629, p>.05,
consistent with the notion that if subjects in the two groups were responding on the basis
of two reasoning systems, they would have been constrained to rely on system 2 to solve
these problems.
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The proportion of conclusions accepted was analyzed initially using a 2 x 2 x 2 x
2 mixed ANOVA with conclusion believability and logical status as within subjects
factors and instructions (deduction vs. induction) and sequence (abstract vs. belief-only)
as between subjects factors. As no effects or interactions were obtained in relation to the
sequence variable, the data were collapsed across this factor and the remaining variables
were analyzed using a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA.
Two results were obtained. First, there was a main effect of logic, indicating
greater acceptance rates for valid than for invalid problems, F(1,120) = 262.599, MSE =
.051, p<.001. Second, there was a main effect of belief, indicating greater acceptance
rates for believable than for unbelievable problems, F(1,120) = 44.977, MSE = .037,
p<.001. The interaction between logic and belief was not significant, though there was a
trend in the expected direction, F(1,120) = 2.779, MSE = .021, p=.098. No other main
effects or interactions approached significance.
ROC Analyses
As in experiment 1, the number of potential corrections for H=1 and F=0 was
quite high (25% of believable hits and false alarms, 14% of unbelievable hits and false
alarms), so it was again necessary to directly compare the ROCs. Accordingly, the
resampling procedure of experiment 1 was applied to the present dataset. ROCs are
plotted in Figures 14-16; the gray lines refer to the upper and lower bounds of the 95%
confidence interval for each (bold) group ROC.
Figure 14A indicates a main effect of logic; the chance line is below the lower
bound of the 95% CI for the logic ROC. 14B indicates a main effect of belief; the chance
line is below the lower bound of the 95% CI for the belief ROC. Although, as in
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experiment 1, the slope of the belief ROC appears to exceed that of the logic ROC (1.09
vs. .83, respectively), in this case for every comparison belief ROCs were very low in x-y
space. As all belief ROCs are likely to be constrained in form by their proximity to the
major diagonal, any conclusions based on apparent differences in slope or shape must be
weighed with caution.
The data in figure 14C are consistent with the results for H-F; the interaction
between logic and belief was not obtained in the present experiment. Additionally, the
slope difference indicated in experiment 1 for believable vs. unbelievable logic ROCs
was not apparent in these functions. This could reflect the fact that in the present
experiment (as well as in the unspeeded group of experiment 1) belief-based responding
was attenuated relative to logic-based responding (14A-14B). From the standpoint of
detection theory, this relatively greater reliance on logic could have reduced the effect of
conflict problems on the argument strength distributions, such that any effect on zROC
slope would have been the result primarily of logical validity. Also, as in experiment 1,
operating points on the believable ROC are shifted upward and rightward relative to the
corresponding points on the unbelievable function. This indicates relatively greater
willingness to accept believable conclusions, and is a further reflection of the effect of
belief illustrated in 14B.
Figure 15A supports the null effect of instructions on the processing of abstract
problems inferred from H-F. The functions are comparable in height, slope (.70 for
deduction, .81 for induction), and position of operating points. Though the shape of the
functions appears to differ somewhat, it must be noted in this respect that the sample size
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was relatively small (n=28 for induction, n=31 for deduction), as was the number of
arguments (8 valid, 8 invalid). These conditions are likely to introduce more noise into
the ROCs than in previous comparisons.
Figures 15B-C agree with the results for H-F in indicating no effect of
instructions on the effects of logic or belief; the induction and deduction CIs for logic
ROCs overlap (15B), as do the CIs for belief ROCs (15C).
An interesting finding in experiment 2 was that the ROCs for abstract and beliefladen stimuli (16A) appear to differ very little in form, height, position of operating
points, and zROC slope (.83 for the logic ROC, .75 for the abstract ROC). This indicates,
in line with the conclusion suggested by the comparison of induction and deduction on
abstract problems, that regardless of whether one expects processing to differ on the basis
of induction vs. deduction (Rips, 2001) or conclusion believability (Evans and CurtisHolmes, 2005), it does not appear that separate reasoning systems contribute to the
processing of information on a single dimension in this task.
Finally, Figure 16B indicates, as in experiment 1, that processing of logic and
belief may differ fundamentally. The abstract and belief ROCs appear to differ in slope
(.75 and 1.09, respectively), as well as shape, with the abstract ROC exhibiting the same
two-piece linearity present in prior comparisons of logic ROCs. This seems to be entirely
absent in the belief ROC, as in experiment 1. As mentioned above, however, the belief
ROCs of the present experiment tend to approximate the major diagonal, rendering any
such comparison potentially misleading.
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Discussion
The present experiment failed to demonstrate an effect of instructions stressing
induction or deduction on performance in a syllogistic reasoning task. While on the
surface this may suggest the findings of Rips (2001) and Heit and Rotello (2005) are to
some extent task-specific, there are a number of potential reasons for the lack of an effect
that remain to be explored. For instance, syllogistic reasoning is a fairly difficult task,
and effects of belief in the present study, though statistically significant, are small in
comparison to the effects of logic. This may indicate that factors inherent in the
syllogistic task bias subjects toward deductive reasoning at the outset. If this is so, the
question remains as to why belief bias is so prevalent in syllogistic reasoning. It may be
that, though related, the processing distinction delineated by Rips (2001) does not map
onto the one drawn by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005). Another possibility is that the
emphasis on instructions, which required subjects to repeat back the stated reasons for
conclusions to be considered valid or strong, may have had an effect, though essentially
the same in both groups. That is, actually engaging subjects in the arguments during the
instruction phase may have biased all subjects toward deductive behavior, despite a
superficial difference in whether such proctored deductions were labeled 'valid' or
'strong.' This would explain both the lack of an instructional effect in the present study,
as well as the unexpected interaction results for both experiments reported in this writing.
Additionally, it should be noted that a null effect of instructions for syllogisms
despite such effects for categorical induction may actually be consistent with the notion
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that separate inductive and deductive reasoning systems exist, assuming the traditional
distinction between deductive and inductive arguments is a product of something more
than academic or pedagogical tradition.
Finally, the prior solution of abstract syllogisms did not have an effect on
subsequent reasoning with belief-laden material. This is not overly surprising, as the
effect reported by Hawkins et al. (1989) was limited to coded justification data and has
never been documented with adults. Additionally, Chen & Daehler (2000) demonstrated
that, in order to instantiate transfer in insight problem solving by way of a prior analogy,
it was be necessary to use analogies that were very similar to the target problem, or that
were actually generated by the subject; a single, dissimilar analogy did not affect
performance relative to controls given irrelevant material in place of an analogy. This
suggests that for transfer in syllogistic reasoning to occur, subjects might profit most
from training that makes explicit the similarity between the logical structure of abstract
and belief-laden examples, as well as from training in the translation of belief-laden
problems into their abstract equivalents.
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Table 3
Proportion of Conclusions Accepted by Group and Problem Type, Experiment 1 and 2.

Experiment 1

Experiment 2

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Problem Type

10 seconds

60 seconds

Unspeeded

Deduction

Induction

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Valid

.72

.85

.80

.81

.85

Invalid

.57

.53

.49

.47

.53

Believable

.77

.73

.72

.70

.74

Unbelievable

.51

.65

.57

.58

.63

Valid Believable

.81

.86

.86

.87

.88

Valid Unbelievable

.62

.84

.73

.75

.81

Invalid Believable

.73

.60

.57

.53

.60

Invalid Unbelievable

.40

.45

.40

.40

.45

Logic Index

.30

.65

.62

.69

.64

Belief Index

.52

.16

.29

.25

.22

Interaction Index

.14

.13

.04

.01

.08

Logic index = P(“Valid”|Valid) – P(“Valid”|Invalid); belief index = P(“Valid”|Believable) – P(“Valid”|Unbelievable); interaction
index = logic index(Unbelievable) – logic index(Believable).
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Table 4
Proportion of Abstract Conclusions Accepted in Experiment 2, by Group.

Problem Type

Deduction

Induction

Valid

.80

.83

Invalid

.53

.44

Valid - Invalid

.27

.39
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B

Hits

Hits

A

False Alarms

False Alarms

D

(.63, .84)

Hits

Hits

C

(.42, .73)

False Alarms

False Alarms

Figure 11. ROCs From Experiment 1. Gray lines indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95 % confidence intervals for each bold ROC. A) Logic ROC,
collapsed across groups. Hits = P(“Valid”|Valid), false alarms = P(“Valid”|Invalid). B) Belief ROC, collapsed across groups. Hits = P(“Valid”|Believable),
false alarms = P(“Valid”|Unbelievable). C) Logic ROCs for syllogisms with believable and unbelievable conclusions. D) 11C with ROCs implied by H - F
superimposed (dashed lines). Interaction Index = .73 - .42 - .84 + .63 = .10.
63

B

Hits

Hits

A

False Alarms

False Alarms

Hits

C

False Alarms

Figure 12. Logic ROCs From Experiment 1, by Group.
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B

Hits

Hits

A

False Alarms

False Alarms

Hits

C

False Alarms

Figure 13. Belief ROCs From Experiment 1, by Group.
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B
Hits

Hits

A

False Alarms

False Alarms

Hits

C

False Alarms

Figure 14. ROCs From Experiment 2. Gray lines indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95 % confidence intervals for each bold ROC. A)
Logic ROC, collapsed across groups. Hits = P(“Valid”|Valid), false alarms = P(“Valid”|Invalid). B) Belief ROC, collapsed across groups. Hits =
P(“Valid”|Believable), false alarms = P(“Valid”|Unbelievable). C) Logic ROCs for syllogisms with believable and unbelievable conclusions.
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B

Hits

Hits

A

False Alarms

False Alarms

Hits

C

False Alarms

Figure 15. Abstract and Belief-Laden ROCs, by Group. A) ROCs for abstract syllogisms, by group. B) Logic ROCs, by group. C) Belief
ROCs, by group.
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B

Hits

Hits

A

False Alarms

False Alarms

Figure 16. Abstract and Belief-Laden ROCs, Collapsed. A) A comparison of logic and abstract ROCs, collapsed over groups. B) A
comparison of abstract and belief ROCs, collapsed over groups.
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CHAPTER III
GENERAL DISCUSSION
While experiment 1 provided support for the 'heuristic-analytic' theory of Evans
and Curtis-Holmes (2005), which proposes subjects apply system 1 and system 2
processes to the evaluation of syllogisms, subjects do not appear to process syllogisms
inductively when instructed to do so. Though the results of experiment 2 could be
interpreted as imposing a limitation on the conclusions reached by Rips (2001) and Heit
and Rotello (2005), there are several reasons for caution in doing so, all of which indicate
the need for further work investigating differences inherent in inductive and deductive
arguments, as well as modes of reasoning.
For example, it is possible that the very act of parsing the premises of syllogisms
may require deductive processes, e.g. to represent quantification and/or to form an initial
representation or model linking subject and predicate via the middle term. This is not the
case for the types of arguments employed by Rips (2001) and Heit and Rotello (2005).
Consider, for instance, the conjunction elimination argument type employed by both
studies:
Jill does D and Jill does R
---------------------------------Jill does D. (10)
The evaluation of (10) does not require subjects to do anything more than 'look up' the
conclusion in the premises. Thus, while Rips' subjects were (nominally) asked whether
the conclusion was 'necessarily true' they may have been (functionally) asked whether the
conclusion 'restates information printed above the line.' In the case of the syllogism (4)
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below, the conclusion does not appear in print, and can only be determined after some
effort is made on the part of the reasoner to restate or represent the problem in a way that
is not explicit in the stimulus (i.e. it is not stated in print).
All X are Y
No Y are Z
-------------No Z are X. (4)
The notion that the processing of premises of propositional arguments (¼ of the
arguments used by Rips were of this sort) is fundamentally different from the processing
of syllogistic premises is supported by conflicting findings in the literature regarding the
effects of premise believability (Thompson, 1996; Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999;
Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Markovits & Schroyens, 2007). Thompson (1996)
presented subjects with valid and invalid propositional arguments that varied in premise
and conclusion believability and found that subjects were more likely to accept believable
conclusions when the premises were also believable than when they were not, with the
size of the effect being similar for valid and invalid problems. For arguments with
believable and unbelievable conclusions neutral and unbelievable premises did not
differentially affect acceptance rates for either valid or invalid arguments. In contrast, a
follow-up experiment by Klauer, Musch, & Naumer (2000; experiment 8) found, for a set
of syllogisms containing two critical invalid arguments, that subjects were more likely to
accept unbelievable conclusions when the premises were unbelievable than when they
were neutral. It is unclear why Klauer et al. obtained conflicting results, but until more
work is directed toward understanding how differences in reasoning tasks such as these
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interact with premise-based reasoning, firm conclusions about the generality of the
inductive/deductive theory may remain elusive.
The present results also suggest that syllogistic arguments may be substantially
more difficult than inductive or categorical arguments in general, and this added
difficulty could have reduced the effectiveness of induction instructions. The relative
difficulty of syllogistic reasoning is implied in the sensitivity indices: accuracy for
deduction subjects in experiment 2 appears to be somewhat lower than in the comparable
condition of Heit and Rotello's experiment 2 (d' = .95 vs. d' = 2.11, respectively).
Additionally, it is worth pointing out that syllogistic reasoning is commonly thought to be
demanding of working memory resources, with several studies demonstrating a positive
relationship between accuracy and memory span in syllogistic reasoning in conclusion
production (Copeland & Radvansky, 2004) and evaluation tasks (Quayle & Ball, 2000),
for both younger and older adults (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). It is not clear how different
are the constraints on memory for induction and syllogistic reasoning, but it would be
quite surprising if arguments like (10) were nearly as demanding in this respect as
arguments like (4). Assuming syllogistic arguments do indeed place greater demands on
working memory resources, no representational difference is actually necessary to
account for the present results. Subjects may simply become so involved in the
processing demands of the relatively complex syllogistic arguments that they fail to
follow or simply forget the instructions detailed at the outset.
Another important difference between the argument types is that the ones used by
Rips (2001) and Heit and Rotello (2005) were largely generics (arguments without
explicit quantification). As stated in the introduction, a major source of difficulty in
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syllogistic reasoning stems from the effects of quantification (Begg & Denny, 1969;
Dickstein, 1975). Though the present study attempted to control the effects of
atmosphere and conversion, more recent research has indicated subjects may have
particular trouble with the logical interpretation of quantifiers ‘Some’ and ‘Some..are
not.’ That is, though logically 'Some X are not Y' is consistent with both 'Some X are Y'
and 'No X are Y', the interpretation of such statements by subjects appears to reflect
conversational interpretations that are more or less consistent with Grice's (1975/2000)
maxim of informativeness. Specifically, it appears that 'Some X are not Y' and 'Some X
are Y' are both taken to imply 'Some X are not Y (and some X are Y)' (Roberts,
Newstead, & Griggs, 2001; Schmidt & Thompson, 2008). In support of this idea,
Schmidt & Thompson (2008) have shown that, when logically clarified quantifiers such
as 'At least some' are used in place of the more ambiguous 'Some', errors in reasoning
with neutral syllogisms are substantially reduced. As the ‘Some’ and ‘Some…are not’
quantifiers were used extensively in the present study (and in many previous studies of
belief bias), it may be that quantification has added a potential source of difficulty to
syllogistic arguments that is not present in categorical or propositional ones. If this is
true, simply adding quantification that nonetheless maintains the logical status of the
categorical induction arguments used in Heit and Rotello's experiment 2 should lower
performance overall for both induction and deduction subjects, and, critically, the
acceptance rates for conflict items in the two groups should even out.
Finally, it is possible that the instructions would actually have been effective but
that in both cases the preparation phase, in which subjects were asked to repeat back the
meaning of the words 'valid' or 'strong', may have pushed all subjects toward a more
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deductive approach. Anecdotally at least, subjects tended when probed about the
meaning of key terms to refer back to the premises of the argument rather than to the
stated definitions of 'valid' or 'strong'. The inclusion of example problems in the
instructions, coupled with the probe question, may have led subjects to approach the
problems deductively in both conditions. This could explain the failure to obtain the
usual interaction between logic and belief, especially if subjects in both groups were led
to discover the principle of logical necessity, which seems to be such an important part of
the deductive approach.
Evidence for the effectiveness of instruction in logical necessity is mixed. An
early study by Dickstein (1981) demonstrated that errors in syllogistic reasoning could be
substantially reduced by including instructional emphasis on logical necessity, but the
effect was only obtained for invalid problems, with additional instructions actually
worsening performance on valid problems. An additional concern is that the results may
not be informative for belief bias experiments in that the materials employed were
abstract and the task was not conclusion evaluation, but 5AFC. More recently, Newstead
et al. (1992; experiment 5) contrasted the effects of standard instructions and instructions
augmented to explain logical necessity on reasoning in the syllogism evaluation task with
belief-laden material. In the standard group, effects of belief, logic, and an interaction
were obtained; in the augmented group, the belief index was reduced, the logic index was
increased, and the interaction did not reach significance. Though not explicit in the
discussion of their results, the authors may have demonstrated a reduction in the belief x
logic interaction by emphasizing analytic processing (more on this later). A follow-up
study by Evans et al. (1994) failed to replicate the effect reported by Newstead et al.;
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nonetheless, their experiment 3 did demonstrate a statistically null belief bias effect, and
a significant reduction in the belief x logic interaction, when an extended (and very
complex) set of augmented instructions was used. The complex instructions of Evans et
al. (1994) did not contain additional passages relating explicitly to logical necessity,
however, leading the authors to conclude factors other than necessity may have
contributed to both their results and those of Newstead et al., though the authors did not
attempt to pinpoint a specific aspect of the complex instructions that could have produced
the result. Thus, though the theory of misinterpreted necessity may not provide an
exhaustive account of belief bias (see Introduction), it appears that an understanding of
the necessity concept may, under some circumstances, influence the extent to which
subjects engage in deductive behavior when reasoning with syllogisms.
If the emphasis on instructions in the present experiment actually drew attention
to syllogistic premises and away from the nominal definition of induction and deduction,
it could have led subjects to understand the issue of logical necessity in both conditions
when encountering the third, indeterminately invalid example (see Preparation
Instructions, Appendix D). This would explain the lack of an interaction in the present
experiment, as well the differences between experiment 1 and the study reported by
Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) (see below). Additionally, if instruction in logical
necessity were shown to have stable effects on reasoning with relatively complex
syllogistic arguments, it could also raise questions regarding the interpretation of the
results reported by Rips (2001). In essence, the difference in conclusion acceptance rates
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for induction relative to deduction may not have been due to emphasis on 'induction' per
se, but rather to an absence of the emphasis on logical necessity which appeared in the
deduction instructions.
The results of experiment 1 are mostly consistent with the data from Evans and
Curtis-Holmes (2005), and more generally, with the predictions of heuristic-analytic
theory articulated by Evans (2006), in which fast-acting system 1 processes are said to
onset relatively early, to supply information that is operated upon subsequently by the
more logically-oriented system 2. When subjects are constrained to respond within 5
seconds of presentation of belief-laden conclusions that logically relate premise
information, the beliefs cued by those conclusions appear to dominate responding. When
subjects are given extra or unlimited time to respond, the influence of belief is reduced
and the influence of logic is increased, in line with the idea that system 2 may intervene
at a relatively later stage to override responses cued by system 1 (Evans, 2006).
For the effects of logic and belief, the ROC results were consistent with results
obtained using the index H-F. Logic ROCs were higher in x-y space when subjects were
allowed extra or unlimited time to respond, while belief ROCs were higher in the space
when subjects were constrained to make speeded decisions.
An unexpected result was the finding of no difference in the height of believable
and unbelievable logic ROCs, despite a robust belief x logic interaction in the analysis of
H-F. This can easily be explained as a consequence of inadvertently (and incorrectly)
assuming the threshold model implied by H-F. More specifically, H-F and related
statistics such as proportion correct (.5*(H+1-F)) assume that sensitivity is being
measured independently of response bias, i.e. that the ROC plotting H against F as a
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function of levels of willingness to say 'Valid' will be linear, with slope = 1. Though the
logic ROCs obtained in the present experiments appear to exhibit linearity, it doesn't
appear that the data would be best described by a regression line, let alone a line of unit
slope. Whether and to what extent this sort of error has contributed to research regarding
the belief x logic interaction is unclear. There are, however, important reasons to
withhold conclusions regarding the apparent reliability of H-F as an index of the
interaction.
First, no conclusive statements regarding the shortcomings of H-F can be made
until the assumptions of threshold models are actually evaluated by fitting them to the
data. Neither threshold nor any competing models were fit to the results of the present
experiment, though in light of this issue and the ROC results (to be discussed below),
model selection appears to be an important next step in research regarding the time
course of syllogistic reasoning.
Second, the interaction results in both experiments conflict with prior findings in
the belief bias literature. Though there was no belief x logic x group interaction apparent
in the results of experiment 1, a post-hoc test confirmed that the interaction index did not
differ from zero for the unspeeded group, t(41) = .860, p = .395. Similarly, no interaction
was obtained for either group in experiment 2.
Third, the post-hoc test suggests further that the interaction in the present study
(nonsignificantly) decreased with an increase in time available for reasoning, which is
diametrically in opposition to the result reported by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005).
This is also in opposition to the interpretation of the interaction by mental models and
selective processing theorists (Ball et al., 2006; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham,
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1989; Polk & Newell, 1995) which assumes it is a product of logical, rather than
heuristic, processes. The present results may suggest analytic processing has made a
surprisingly profound contribution in the 10 second group of the present experiment. It
may also mean that the interaction is actually a product of heuristic, not analytic,
processes. Interestingly, one of the few studies besides that of Evans and Curtis-Holmes
to compare conclusion evaluation under a deadline of 10 seconds with performance under
a longer deadline (60 seconds) also found an interaction between logic and belief in the
shorter deadline condition (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). Further, when subjects were
given extra time (1 minute) to reconsider their responses, the interaction did not decrease
despite an increase in the logic index, similar to the corresponding between-subjects
result of the present study. The authors replicated this pattern in a second experiment. In
their general discussion, Shynkaruk and Thompson stated that “..one must conclude that
the interaction is not due to formal reasoning processes but, rather, arises from the
application of fast and simple heuristics, which can be applied in about 10 sec., “ (p.
630). Note that the same implication also follows from the instruction results of
Newstead et al. (1992) and Evans et al. (1994), in which training in logical necessity
reduced the interaction. Taken together, these findings seem to converge on the notion
that the belief x logic interaction is not a product of analytic processes as has previously
been assumed, but is due rather to heuristic processes, in agreement with Shynkaruk and
Thompson (2006).
On the other hand, the interaction is likely dependent to some degree on effects of
both logic and belief, and shortcomings of the present study in terms of the size of these
effects may be responsible for reducing the interaction. Specifically, though the
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magnitude of belief and logic effects appears to be comparable in the present
experiments, the logic effect was in both the 10 second and unspeeded groups
substantially larger than in the comparable conditions of Evans and Curtis-Holmes' study
(for the 10 second groups: d = .81 and .53, respectively; for the unspeeded groups: d =
1.32 and 1.01). The belief effect was also smaller in the present study than in the earlier
one, and the difference appeared to be more pronounced when subjects had to make
speeded decisions (for the 10 second groups: d = 1.30 and 2.27, respectively; for the
unspeeded groups: d = .69 and .91).
It is unclear why the studies should differ in this way. One possibility is that the
increase in logic-based responding is a result of the preparation instructions, mentioned
earlier. If subjects adopted a more deductive approach to the problems as a result of the
question probe, and particularly if subjects were led to discover the principle of logical
necessity, it could have produced the differences in effect size between the two studies, as
well as reducing the effect of induction instructions in experiment 2. Unfortunately, this
leaves unexplained the odd pattern in effect sizes for the belief index. Why should the 10
second groups differ to a greater extent than the unspeeded groups? An alternative
explanation follows from the design of experiment 1. As in Evans and Curtis-Holmes'
design, the 10 second group was presented with premises in isolation, with the conclusion
onsetting halfway through each trial, while for the unspeeded (and 60 second) groups the
present experiment deviated from the prior design in that premises and conclusion were
presented simultaneously. This was done in order to render conditions comparable to
traditional belief bias preparations, allowing a more valid assessment of the potential
effect of imposing a deadline with respect to previous work. It is possible, though, that
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the design of Evans and Curtis-Holmes is to some extent similar to a production task in
that subjects were more likely to engage in premise-based (forward) reasoning as
opposed to conclusion-based (backward) reasoning, in which subjects do not attempt to
integrate the premise terms until after the conclusion has been read (cf. Morley et al.,
2004). As mentioned in the introduction, Morley et al. (2004) have demonstrated that
production tasks minimize belief bias effects relative to evaluation tasks. If the 10
second and unspeeded groups of experiment 1 can be seen as approximating forward and
backward reasoning tasks, respectively, then the confound could to some extent reduce
belief bias in the 10 second group of the present experiment relative to the unspeeded
group, which may have also seen a correspondingly increase in the effect. This would
account for both the exaggeration in differences between effect sizes of the 10 second and
unspeeded groups of the two studies, as well as the marginal status of the effect of extra
time in the unspeeded group by the standards of the Bonferroni correction. This is not
altogether far-fetched so long as one accepts the notion of Morley et al. that the effect of
conclusion-based reasoning is to bias the representation of the premises, which would be
especially hard to imagine in the 10 second group, for which less than 5 seconds would
be available for subjects to reconsider them.
In any case, the possibility of such confounding influences suggests a profitable
direction for future work might be to examine separately the effects of response deadlines
and conclusion onsets, as well as comparing the effects of the present instruction
procedure with the 'standard' technique of Newstead et al. (1992).
Finally, visual inspection of the form of belief and logic ROCs suggests different
models for belief-based and logic-based responding. For the 10 second group, where
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system 1 should have predominated in determining responses, the belief ROC was
substantially above the chance line, and appeared to be more curvilinear than the logic
ROCs of the 60 second and unspeeded groups. This suggests system 1 may be sensitive
to gradients in believability; the best-fitting model for heuristic processing, then, might be
one that assumes a continuous strength variable, such as unequal-variance detection
theory. When logic-based responding predominated, as in the 60 second and unspeeded
groups, the logic ROCs were substantially above the chance line, and appeared to exhibit
two-piece linearity, which may suggest subjects experience some difficulty in making
fine discriminations in response to the logic dimension, despite being relatively consistent
in separating valid and invalid arguments. Whether this necessarily implies a threshold
model assuming a small number of discrete states (e.g. Krantz, 1969) or a detection
model assuming criterion variability (e.g. Mueller & Weidemann, 2008) is an open
question. Clearly, an important next step in research on heuristic and analytic decisionmaking is the application of models assuming fundamentally different underlying
processes. ROCs will be an important part of such a venture, providing both a testing
ground for the assumptions of new models of reasoning, as well as helping researchers to
avoid erroneous conclusions that may result from inappropriately assuming threshold
statistics as measures of logical competence.
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APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS FOR INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION
Induction Instructions
In this experiment, we are interested in people’s reasoning.
For each question, you will be given some information that you should
assume to be true. This will appear ABOVE a line. Then you will be asked
about a conclusion sentence BELOW the line. First, you will be asked
whether the conclusion is strong or not strong. By “strong”, we mean
that assuming the information above the line is true, this makes the
sentence below the line *plausible*. Second, you will be asked how
confident you are in this judgment.
You should just answer each question as best as you can, based on the
information available.
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions.
(insert problem here)
Assuming the information above the line is true, does this make the
sentence below the line *plausible*?
NOT STRONG or STRONG
(F)
(J)

How confident are you in this judgment?
1=not at all confident, 2=moderately confident, 3=very confident
Press # key: 1 2 3
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Deduction Instructions
In this experiment, we are interested in people’s reasoning.
For each question, you will be given some information that you should
assume to be true. This will appear ABOVE a line. Then you will be asked
about a conclusion sentence BELOW the line. First, you will be asked
whether the conclusion is valid or not valid. By “valid”, we mean that
assuming the information above the line is true, this *necessarily*
makes the sentence below the line true. Second, you will be asked how
confident you are in this judgment.
You should just answer each question as best as you can, based on the
information available.
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions.
(PROBLEM HERE)
Assuming the information above the line is true, does this *necessarily*
make the sentence below the line true?
Not VALID or VALID
(F)
(J)

How confident are you in this judgment?
1=not at all confident, 2=moderately confident, 3=very confident
Press # key: 1 2 3
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APPENDIX B
CONCLUSION RATINGS FOR NEW CONTENT

Believable
Some animals are not llamas
Some bears are not grizzlies
Some birds are not parrots
Some boats are not canoes
Some cars are not oldsmobiles
Some criminals are not robbers
Some dances are not tangos
Some drinks are not beers
Some horses are not ponies
Some insects are not spiders
Some killers are not assassins
Some plants are not weeds
Some relatives are not uncles
Some reptiles are not lizards
Some storms are not blizzards
Some trees are not oaks
Some weapons are not cannons
Some words are not verbs
Some writers are not novelists

Mean

SD

Unbelievable

4.55
4.75
4.68
4.35
4.19
4.61
4.68
4.82
3.68
4.58
3.96
4.52
4.84
4.39
4.86
4.55
4.61
4.86
4.79

1.21
0.84
1.06
1.31
1.56
1.05
0.90
0.77
1.63
1.09
1.69
1.15
0.73
1.29
0.76
1.23
1.17
0.76
0.79

Some llamas are not animals
Some grizzlies are not bears
Some parrots are not birds
Some canoes are not boats
Some oldsmobiles are not cars
Some robbers are not criminals
Some tangos are not dances
Some beers are not drinks
Some ponies are not horses
Some spiders are not insects
Some assassins are not killers
Some weeds are not plants
Some uncles are not relatives
Some lizards are not reptiles
Some blizzards are not storms
Some oaks are not trees
Some cannons are not weapons
Some verbs are not words
Some novelists are not writers

Mean
1.00
1.52
1.19
1.86
1.43
2.11
1.65
1.58
2.42
2.07
1.32
2.29
2.29
1.48
1.55
1.96
2.61
1.55
1.84

SD
0.00
1.21
0.79
1.56
0.96
1.59
1.23
1.36
1.78
1.56
0.79
1.58
1.67
1.06
1.15
1.50
1.73
1.36
1.49

New conclusions were selected from a pool of 96 believable and unbelievable
conclusions rated in a previous study; a 5-point scale was used, in which a 1
corresponded to ‘Unbelievable’ and a 5 corresponded to ‘Believable.’ One sample t tests
indicate that the selected believable conclusions are rated as more believable than the
unbelievable ones (p<.001), and the ratings for believable conclusions are neither more
nor less variable than ratings for unbelievable ones (p=.19).
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APPENDIX C
PROBLEM STRUCTURES USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2

A
Set A
Valid
Invalid
EI2_O1 EI2_O2
EI3_O1 EI3_O2
EI4_O1 EI4_O2
IE4_O2 IE4_O1

B
Set B
Valid
Invalid
OA2_O2 OE2_O2
AO2_O1 EO2_O1
OA3_O1 OE3_O1
AO3_O2 EO3_O2

No X are Y
Some Z are Y
---------------------Some Z are not X

A) Structures are identified by quantifiers used in the premises, with the first letter
corresponding to the first premise and the 3rd letter corresponding to the conclusion.
Following the quantifiers for the two premises will be a number corresponding to figure,
and following the quantifier for the conclusion will be a number corresponding to the
ordering of conclusion terms. A 1 indicates a conclusion in the Z-X direction and a 2
indicates a conclusion in the X-Z direction. B) Using this notation, the above example
would be syllogism EI2_O1.
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APPENDIX D

PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS
Experiment 1 (All Subjects) and Experiment 2 (Deduction)
In the experiment, you will be asked to judge whether some conclusions are logically
valid. By logically valid, we mean that the conclusion must be true, after you take
account of the given information.
The given information is shown above the line, and the conclusion is shown below the
line. For example,
All shamuses are theurgists
Some cowboys are shamuses
----------------------------Some cowboys are theurgists

Given the fact that all shamuses are theurgists, and some cowboys are shamuses, it must
be true that some cowboys are theurgists. So this conclusion is valid. Why?
Here’s another example.
All carolingians are paladins
All rulers are carolingians
----------------------------All rulers are paladins

Given that all carolingians are paladins, and all rulers are carolingians, it must be true that
all rulers are paladins. So this conclusion is valid. Why?
Now consider this example.
All karrozzins are hammerkops
No karrozzins are sculptors
--------------------------------All sculptors are hammerkops

Given the fact that all karrozzins are hammerkops, and no karrozins are sculptors, you
can’t conclude that all sculptors must be hammerkops. So, this conclusion is not valid.
Why?
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In this experiment, it is very important that you only say that a conclusion is valid
when it must be true given the information above the line. If the conclusion is not
necessarily true, then say not valid.
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions.

Preparation Instructions: Experiment 2 (Induction)

In the experiment, you will be asked to judge whether some conclusions are strong. By
strong, we mean that the conclusion is plausible, after you take account of the given
information.
The given information is shown above the line, and the conclusion is shown below the
line. For example,
All shamuses are theurgists
Some cowboys are shamuses
----------------------------Some cowboys are theurgists
Given the fact that all shamuses are theurgists, and some cowboys are shamuses, it is
plausible that some cowboys are theurgists. So this conclusion is strong. Why?
Here’s another example.
All carolingians are paladins
All rulers are carolingians
------------------------------All rulers are paladins
Given that all carolingians are paladins, and all rulers are carolingians, it is plausible that
all rulers are paladins. So this conclusion is strong. Why?
Now consider this example.
All karrozzins are hammerkops
No karrozzins are sculptors
--------------------------------All sculptors are hammerkops
This conclusion is not strong. Given the fact that all karrozzins are hammerkops, and no
karrozzins are sculptors, it’s not plausible that all sculptors are hammerkops. Why?
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In this experiment, it is very important that you only say that a conclusion is strong
when it is plausible given the information above the line. If the conclusion is not
likely, then say not strong.
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions
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APPENDIX E

DEADLINE PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS
In this experiment, you will have (insert 10 seconds, 16 seconds,
or 1 minute) to respond 'Valid' or 'Invalid'. A timer will
indicate how much time is left before a response must be made.
If you do not respond in time, you will be advanced automatically
to the next trial.
After you make a response, you will be asked how confident you
are that the response was correct. Your confidence rating will
not be timed, however, and you should use this time wisely to
accurately indicate your rating.
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APPENDIX F

PRACTICE PROBLEMS FOR EXPERIMENT 2
Deduction
Welcome to the experiment! In this study, we are interested in people's reasoning. You will be
asked to respond to several short logic problems; some of them will be rather easy and some
may be a bit more complex. In any case, just try to do the best that you can. Below is an
example of what you will see in the experiment; to be sure you understand the task before
engaging in the experiment, please try the practice problems below and be sure to ask the
experimenter if you have any questions.
For each question, you will be given some information that you should assume to be true. This
will appear ABOVE a line. Then you will be asked about a conclusion sentence BELOW the line.
First, you will be asked whether the conclusion is valid or not valid. By “valid”, we mean that
assuming the information above the line is true, this *necessarily* makes the sentence below the
line true. Second, you will be asked how confident you are in this judgment.
You should just answer each question as best as you can, based on the information available.
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions.
Example Problem 1
No invectives are critiques
Some invectives are vituperations
------------------------------------------------Some vituperations are not critiques
Assuming the information above the line is true, does this *necessarily*
make the sentence below the line true?
NOT VALID

or

VALID

(Circle one)
How confident are you in this judgment?
1=not at all confident, 2=moderately confident, 3=very confident
Circle one:

1

2

3

Example Problem 2
All chameleons are squamates
Some coxcombs are squamates
---------------------------------------------Some chameleons are coxcombs
Assuming the information above the line is true, does this *necessarily*
make the sentence below the line true?
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NOT VALID

or

VALID

(Circle one)
How confident are you in this judgment?
1=not at all confident, 2=moderately confident, 3=very confident
Circle one:

1

2

3

Induction
Welcome to the experiment! In this study, we are interested in people's reasoning. You will be
asked to respond to several short logic problems; some of them will be rather easy and some
may be a bit more complex. In any case, just try to do the best that you can. Below is an
example of what you will see in the experiment; to be sure you understand the task before
engaging in the experiment, please try the practice problems below and be sure to ask the
experimenter if you have any questions.
For each question, you will be given some information that you should assume to be true. This
will appear ABOVE a line. Then you will be asked about a conclusion sentence BELOW the line.
First, you will be asked whether the conclusion is strong or not strong. By “strong”, we mean that
assuming the information above the line is true, this makes the sentence below the line
*plausible*. Second, you will be asked how confident you are in this judgment.
You should just answer each question as best as you can, based on the information available.
Please ask the experimenter if you have any questions.
Example Problem 1
No invectives are critiques
Some invectives are vituperations
------------------------------------------------Some vituperations are not critiques
Assuming the information above the line is true, does this make the
sentence below the line *plausible*?
NOT STRONG

or

STRONG

(Circle one)
How confident are you in this judgment?
1=not at all confident, 2=moderately confident, 3=very confident
Circle one:

1

2

3
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Example Problem 2
All chameleons are squamates
Some coxcombs are squamates
---------------------------------------------Some chameleons are coxcombs
Assuming the information above the line is true, does this make the
sentence below the line *plausible*?
NOT STRONG

or

STRONG

(Circle one)
How confident are you in this judgment?
1=not at all confident, 2=moderately confident, 3=very confident
Circle one:

1

2

3
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